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Accumulation of Discounts
By Frederick Vierling
We inquire: Is it the duty of trustees to accumulate discounts
on bonds purchased at less than par?
For the first time in history there was decided by an appellate
court the question propounded above. (See decision rendered
Feb. 23,1926, by supreme court of California in matter of estate of
Gartenlaub.) By will testator placed in trust an estate valued
at about $476,000. In the will it is provided that the “net
income revenue and profits” of the estate should be paid to
certain life-tenants. The trustee was directed as soon as might be
to convert investments not of the kind approved by the testator
and to re-invest proceeds in particular bonds and other securities
indicated by the testator. Testator thus expressly authorized
investment in bonds.
I
In the same estate, on a former appeal to the supreme court of
California, the question was raised whether premiums paid by the
trustee, in the purchase of bonds at prices in excess of par, should
be charged against principal or income of the estate. The court
held that such premiums paid must be amortized by charges
to income of the estate, so that such bonds will stand in the ac
counts of the trustee at maturity at par—par being the amount of
principal then payable thereon. In this later appeal the court
refers to the former appeal and to the fact that the court founded
its decision in the former appeal on the proposition that the court
should set forth the essential principles covering the administra
tion of trusts of this character and hence covering this particular
trust; that the court found the existence of a corpus as an essen
tial element and the preservation of such corpus until the termina
tion of the life estate indispensable to the fulfillment of the plans of
the testator; that any depletion of the corpus tends to frustrate
the fundamental purpose of the trust and should be avoided.
Certainly the estate should be so managed by the trustee that there
may be no deliberate depletion of the corpus. Since the payment
of the coupon rate of interest on a bond purchased at a premium
would result in the payment of more than the effective rate of
interest on the bond, such payment of the coupon rate in equity
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should not be permitted. By regular amortization of premiums
out of coupon collections encroachment on the corpus is avoided.
Amortization of premiums is now approved by the great weight of
decisions of courts of last resort. Unfortunately, however, there
are still a few exceptions.

II
The sole question presented in the later appeal involves the
right of the life-tenant to have discounts at which bonds are
purchased by the trustee accumulated and paid over to the life
tenant. The court in the later appeal holds that the life-tenant
has no such right. As above noted, in the former appeal it was
held that premiums should be amortized, in order that the in
tegrity of the corpus of the estate may be preserved. This is an
equitable rule. There is also another equitable rule, of equal
force, namely: The corpus of an estate should not be unduly
increased at the expense of the life-tenant. As all kinds of good
bonds are purchased from time to time at prevailing rates of in
come for money, prices of such bonds fluctuate from time to time—
sometimes they are at par, sometimes at a premium and some
times at a discount. It is a fundamental fact that premiums and
discounts on bond investments affect the income basis of the in
vestment and do not concern the corpus of the estate. In either
case it is equitable to adjust the premium or the discount, so that
such bonds will stand in the accounts of trustees at par at matu
rity. Such purchases are made at values shown in bond tables.
These tables show the price at which purchases must be made in
order to earn the stipulated net income. Bond tables are in con
stant use in this and in all other commercial countries. They have
been proven to be scientific and exact and of indisputable author
ity. To purchase bonds on the basis of such tables, and after
purchase to ignore the basis of such purchase, is not equitable; it
injures the remainderman in case of a premium bond and injures
the life-tenant in case of a discount bond. Trustees must be
impartial between life-tenant and remainderman. Since the court
requires the adjustment of premiums, it is unfair not to require
the adjustment of discounts.

III
The life-tenant insists that discounts should be accumulated
and paid to her. The court explains its views as follows: In the
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case of bonds purchased at a discount the amount of such discount
remains in the hands of the trustee, in the form of uninvested
corpus, and does not become any part of the income of the estate.
Of course any uninvested corpus remains in the hands of the
trustee and does not become part of the income of the estate.
Income is entitled to earnings only on invested funds. The
court misses the point at issue by assuming that the difference
between par value of discount bonds and the price paid is in the
hands of the trustee and remains. The trustee is able to buy
more bonds when they are at a discount than when they are at a
premium. Whatever the amount invested, the life-tenant is
entitled to the income thereon at the prevailing rate of interest.
Even if a trustee makes all its investments in bonds at par or at
a premium, if the exact amount desired is not available, there will
be a balance of corpus not invested. The situation is the same
when investments are made in bonds at a discount. The court
evidently is not experienced in such matters and therefore made
the error. The court expresses another erroneous conclusion as
follows: It does not follow, since the life-tenant must yield up a
portion of the income, in order to maintain the integrity of the
corpus, that the life-tenant must be entitled to the discount,
which, if allowed, would impair the corpus of the trust. If allow
ing the discount would impair the corpus, then the court is correct;
but allowing the life-tenant the accrued discount merely allows
the life-tenant the accruing discount as part of the earnings of
the investment, in addition to the contract rate of interest shown
by the coupons. The accumulation of discounts scientifically
was contemplated at the time of purchase. Crediting income
with the accumulating discount and writing up the investment
value of bond as it nears maturity is not losing anything for the
estate. At maturity the discount bond will have been written
up to par, the exact amount at which it will be paid. It is erro
neous to assume that something is lost—nothing is lost.

IV
The court continues thus: The only possible basis upon which
the life-tenant can rest the claim that she is entitled to receive
the amount of unexpended corpus, represented by the discount
on any particular bond purchased, consists in the assumption that
the controlling reason why bonds of equal safety, with bonds
269
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selling at par or a premium, may be purchased at a discount, is
because bonds at a discount yield lower interest rates (of course
meaning that they bear a lower contract rate of interest) and,
this being so, the life-tenant is entitled to have the amount of the
discount accumulated and paid over to her, in order to make up
to her the amount of income which she would have received had
the trustee invested in bonds at par, and hence in bonds bearing
a larger (contract) rate of interest. In order to support this
assumption, the life-tenant urges that in the purchase of bonds
trustees are governed by bond tables, wherein the value of any
bond is determined by the rate of interest which it carries; that,
the life-tenant argues from these premises, since the corpus of
the estate can suffer no ultimate impairment from the investment
in safe bonds at a discount, she is entitled to such discount. The
court answers: This assumption is not true in point of fact. We
answer: Nevertheless, accountants and students of finance and ac
counting know that the assumption is true. If the court will test
the proposition by making the calculations necessary to check
out and verify any value of bonds given in a standard bond table,
the court will find itself again in error. The value may be proven
by quite simple arithmetical calculations. For the court to
make the assertion, without making the test, is futile. The
formula may be applied to a bond based on its contract rate of
interest and will prove the bond to be worth par; the result will
be self-proving. Surely the court will not ignore the correctness
of the formula in such a case. The formula then may be applied
to bonds at a premium and the value of premium bonds thus es
tablished. Surely the court will not now gainsay the correctness
of the proposition, having approved premium bonds in the former
appeal involving the question of amortization of premiums. If
the court will next apply the formula to bonds at a discount, the
court can not help but convince itself that bond tables may be
relied upon, even where a purchase of bonds at a discount is
involved. Further, if the court will stop to consider the millions
of transactions each year between persons, firms and corporations
experienced in investment matters, both between themselves and
between their hundreds of thousands of customers, the court will
not continue its erroneous assertion. If a scientific fact is def
initely established, even courts can not by immature reasoning
or fiat continue the error. Remember Columbus, Galileo and
hosts of others, pioneers in their respective fields.
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V
The court suggests that it is the duty of the trustee, in making
investments of corpus, to determine questions of fact as to the
safety of each investment, determinable by other conditions and
considerations than those derived merely from the study or com
parison of bond tables or the state of the money and bond market
as shown thereby. We agree with the court in the proposition
that the safety of an investment is not shown by reference to a
bond table. The bond table is intended merely to show what will
be the effective rate of return on a bond at a stated price, having a
certain number of years to run and bearing a fixed rate of interest,
or to give information as to the effective yield of a bond having a
certain number of years to run and quoted at a certain price.
All other things being satisfactory, the trustee must needs inquire
into these matters. If the effective rate of return is shown to be
too low, considering a fair return for money for the time being,
although all other questions are satisfactorily answered, the trus
tee must not make the particular investment presented. Apply
ing high investment standards, the trustee should of course look
for other investments yielding a fair return. The trustee is not
limited to bonds selling at par or to bonds selling at a premium, but
may invest in bonds selling at a discount. If the trustee invests
in bonds at a discount, the trustee may not equitably ignore such
discount as part of the earnings of the investment, as the discount
accumulates. The bond was purchased on the basis that the
trustee would consider the accumulating discount as a profit in
herent in the investment at the time of purchase, and not as an
accidental appreciation of property caused by conditions and
influences outside of the investment when made. Such ac
cumulating discount added to the contract rate of interest on the
bond will represent the effective rate of return of the investment.
The contract rate of interest allowed would represent merely the
nominal or contract rate of return, not the actual return. From
the language of the court, it might be implied that it was thought
that a bond table would indicate the state of the money market
or bond market. Of course such thought would be absurd.

VI
The court seems to rely on the testimony of one witness in
reaching its decision. The court refers to him as admittedly an
expert in both knowledge and experience in respect of state of
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bond market and money market. His testimony was to the effect
that in buying bonds as an investment safety is the first considera
tion ; that it is the duty of the trustee to maintain the corpus of the
estate intact, as far as the trustee can. Certainly that is true.
Nevertheless, the trustee should be fair and not unduly increase
the corpus of the estate at the expense of the life-tenant. If the
trustee will not accumulate discounts for the benefit of the life
tenant, then the trustee should not make investments in bonds
below par, but confine itself to bonds at par or at a premium.
The witness is also quoted as saying, “As between bonds which
may be considered equally safe for investment purposes, he would
purchase the one which yielded the higher (contract) rate of
return. The fact that safe bonds will sell at a discount at any
time is due very largely to general financial conditions and to the
fact that other bonds, presumably as safe, pay a higher (contract)
rate of interest on their par value.” The effect of this testimony
is that, as between two bonds of equal safety as an investment,
selling at the same price, he would select the one selling at the
higher (contract) rate of interest. Of course he would. It fol
lows that a bond selling at the lower contract rate of interest to
meet such competition would have to sell at a lower price or at a
discount. If at a discount, the amount of the discount would
automatically bear on the income basis of the investment. This
is proven by the bond table and may be proven without a bond
table. Why continue to assert that the accumulating discount
does not increase the earning shown by the coupon rate? Just as
well assert that amortization of premium does not decrease the
coupon rate.
VII

The court, referring to the testimony of the one witness,
says: “The effect of the foregoing evidence is to negative the
assumption that the controlling factor, in determining bond in
vestments by trustees, is that of the state of the market as shown
by bond tables and to affirm the right of trustees to invest the
corpus of the trust estate in bonds which may at the time of the
investment be obtainable at a premium or at par or at a discount,
regardless of the return in the way of (contract) interest provided
for.” The court must have written these thoughts inadvertently.
The testimony speaks for itself. It is not claimed that bond
tables show the state of the market for money or bonds. No
272
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testimony was necessary to refute the thought. Would any testi
mony establish the right of the trustee to invest in bonds at a
premium or at par or at a discount, regardless of the contract rate
of interest of the bond ? Certainly not. The court continues that
if this be true—referring to its remarks above—it shows, since
the right of the life-tenant is measured by the duty of the trustee,
the full amount to which the life-tenant would be entitled in the
way of income would be none other than the amount actually
provided for as income by the terms of the bond, regardless of
the price at which it had been acquired. In the former appeal
the court laid down the proposition that the premium must be
amortized out of interest coupon collections. Bonds purchased
at par need no adjustment of premiums or discount. Bonds
purchased at a discount—shall we forget them? Certainly not;
let us be just between the beneficiaries of estates.
VIII

The term “income, revenue and profits” has been held in a
uniform line of decisions not to include increase from any cause
in the value of the corpus of a trust estate. The court quotes
the cases below mentioned as sustaining that proposition. I
have examined each case, and find not one that bears on the point
at issue in the present appeal. The cases quoted all relate to
ordinary appreciation of property and not to accumulating dis
count on bonds purchased by trustees below par. In the cases
noted the increases are accidental increases, not inherent in the
investment when made. The discount on bonds purchased
below par show an inherent profit, expected and relied on as a
profit to the amount of the discount. Let us review the cases
in the order of their publication:
Townsend v. Trust Co. (1877) 3 Redfield N. Y. Rep. 220: The
trustee invested three funds of $5,000 each in government bonds,
and later sold bonds at profit of $400 for each fund. Trustee also
made profit of $37.50 on purchase of government bonds at a
discount. These bonds increased in value. Question was: Could
the surplus received by the trustee be regarded either as interest,
income or dividends? Decision: Court ruled the increase could
not be taken as income; that life-tenant can not be charged with
depreciation; and converse of the proposition is true, that he can
not receive the increase of the capital; that the general rule seems
to be, the enhanced value of the principal goes to the remainder
273

The Journal of Accountancy
man. Note: This case applies to ordinary and non-contractual
increase of securities, not to the point now at issue.
In re Gerry (1886) 103 N. Y. 445: Question arose between
representative of life-tenant and remainderman with reference to
disposition of an increase in amount of trust fund, discoverable
upon a sale of securities . . . after life-estate terminated. In
1828 testator bequeathed $70,000 in trust to invest in specified
securities; a sale of the securities by the trustee after the death
of the life-tenant resulted in a surplus of nearly $23,000 over the
amount of the original investment; the will gave life-tenant annual
interest, income and dividends of trust fund. Decision: All
beyond this must from necessity have been intended to go to the
remainderman, for there are no other persons who could lawfully
take it. In this case the investment is directed to be made in
securities bearing a fixed rate of interest; the increase in question
seems to have been because of a depreciation in the rate of interest
affected by natural causes which gave an increased value to
securities bearing higher rates of former times. This constituted
in no sense a profit from the investment, but was an accretion to
the fund itself arising from natural causes and was liable to be
altogether lost by the approximation of the securities to the period
of their maturity. If the will had required the trustee to invest
in real estate, it can not be questioned that any increase in the
value of land from natural causes would be an accretion to the
capital and inure to the benefit of the remainderman; one can see
no difference in principle between this case and the one supposed.
Note: This case applies also to ordinary and non-contractual
increase of securities, not to the point now at issue.
Duclos v. Benner (1891) 17 N. Y. S. 168: Trustee invested
$30,000 in government bonds; later sold bonds at profit of $3465;
profit claimed by life-tenant as income on trust fund, in addition
to (contract) interest collected on bonds; under will life-tenant
was entitled to income, interest, profits and earnings of the trust
fund. Decision: Held the profit arising from the sale was accre
tion to the capital of the estate and must be held as such; that life
tenant was entitled to any increase of income by reason of the in
vestment of the profit. Note: This case applies also to ordinary and
non-contractual increase of securities, not to the point now at issue.
In re Vedder (1891) 2 Connolly N. Y. Rep. 548: Question was
whether representatives of life-tenant were entitled to receive in
crease in value of securities held by the trustee or should such in274
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crease be held to be a part of the principal? The trustee realized
by sale an excess of $10,200. Decision: An increase from natural
causes in the value of real and personal estate held as an invest
ment does not constitute profit and go to the life-tenant; such
increase becomes principal and goes to the remainderman. Note:
This case applies also to ordinary and non-contractual increase
of securities, not to the point now at issue.
In re Cutler (1898) 52 N. Y. S. 842: Eight thousand eight
hundred dollars in par value of stocks, bonds and other securities
constituted residue and formed trust estate; what was actual value
of the securities does not appear; surviving executor realized
$12,000 from sale of securities; certain beneficiaries claimed
difference between the two sums as income. Decision: Life
tenant was undoubtedly entitled to the income from the estate in
remainder; if she succeeded in living without that income and
saved for several years a part thereof, these savings undoubtedly
belonged to her absolutely. It now becomes necessary to deter
mine whether this apparent increase is a result of accumulation of
income or whether it is simply an increase resulting from the sale
of stocks, bonds and other securities. Decision: In investments
and re-investments of this kind, the gains realized are capital and
not income; gains made on stock taken at par and sold above par
are accretions to the estate in remainder. Note: This case
applies also to ordinary and non-contractual increase of securities,
not to the point now at issue.
In re Graham (1901) 198 Pa. 216: Trustee sold real estate
and invested proceeds in certain bonds; trustee also purchased
additional bonds of same issue; later sold bonds at a profit of
$17,750. Trustee also received certain shares at appraised value;
property of company was condemned and trustee received $50,288
in excess of appraised value of stock. Decision, first question:
The profit of the sale of these bonds was realized by reason of the
enhancement in value of the trust investments and is not income
from them; it is part of the corpus and should be so held by the
trustee. Decision, second question: Where a corporation sells a
part of its property and distributes the proceeds as a dividend
among its stockholders, such dividend is capital and not income;
the excess received by the trustee on the stock mentioned above
its appraised value is part of the corpus of the trust. Note: This
case also applies to ordinary and non-contractual increase of
securities, not to the point now at issue.
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Stewart v. Phelps (1902) 75 N. Y. S. 526: Testator bequeathed
an estate valued at $4,714,833 in trust for his daughter; he directed
certain payments out of capital to be made to her at various times
and such payments were made; balance of assets remained in
trust; by sale of securities for more than appraised value, trustee
realized excess of $399,067; trustee also made purchases and
sales and realized additional profits of $129,969; rights to
subscribe to additional stock of corporation were sold for $6,243;
trustee also received a stock dividend from a corporation, which
trustee sold for $1,987; referee allowed life-tenant proceeds of
sale of stock dividend and item of $416 interest realized on
a security sold; referee held the remaining increases in the estate
were accretion to the principal of the trust fund, to which the
life-tenant was not entitled. Decision: Court sustained hold
ings of referee. Note: This case applies also to ordinary and
non-contractual increase of securities, not to the point now at
issue.
In the present appeal the court also refers to Perry, on Trusts,
6th ed., sec. 546. One finds the following language: “Any accre
tion to the fund itself, . . . as by the rise in value of securities,
goes to the remainderman. The life-tenant also derives advantage
from this increased value, through the larger income resulting;
but, if the securities mature or are sold, the increased value be
longs to the remainderman.” Note: The text applies to ordinary
and non-contractual increases in value of trust assets, not to the
point now at issue.

IX
The court in its decision in the present appeal expresses itself
thus: “We think it may be taken to be settled that increase of a
trust fund, resulting from the increase in the value of bonds or
other securities, due to whatever cause, ought to be regarded as
part of the corpus of the trust and not as income to which the life
tenant is entitled.” Since the cases quoted bear only on ordinary
increases, and not on accumulating discounts, the court should
differentiate between ordinary increases and the court’s so-called
increases by way of accumulating discount, since they are unlike
and each has different characteristics. Ordinary increases are
increases not contracted for and accumulating discounts are
increases contracted for at the time of purchase of bonds below
par.
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X

The court continues: “This conclusion (of the court) gains
added force from the consideration, whenever bonds are purchased
by the trustee at a discount, that the amount of such discount re
mains in the hands of the trustee as uninvested part of the corpus
of the trust fund. It is the duty of the trustee to make a timely
investment of the same in other securities, to the interest upon
which as it accrues the life-tenant would be entitled; thus there
would be made up to her approximately the amount of income
which she would have received had the original investment been
in bonds at par. This is all to which she would have been en
titled.” Again the court has fallen into error. Of course unin
vested corpus remains in the hands of the trustee and the life
tenant is not entitled thereto. The life-tenant is entitled only to
income on the fund when invested. (See comment already made
on this point above.) Reference to a bond table will show that
there are different rates of return on an investment of $900 at par
in a 5 per cent. semi-annual bond having 10 years to run and an
investment of $900 in a 4 per cent. semi-annual bond at 90, the
latter also having 10 years to run. In the first case the investment
will show a return of $45 a year; in the second case a return of
$53 a year, a difference in return of approximately $8 on each
$900 invested. An estate of $476,000 is equal to 528 times $900.
Five hundred and twenty-eight times the difference of $8 equals
an annual loss of $4224. Such annual loss is too great to be dis
missed in the off-hand way indicated by the remarks of the court
that “there would be made up to the life-tenant approximately
the amount of income she would have received had the original
investment been in bonds of par.” During a long life-tenancy the
loss would be enormous.
XI
The will provides for the payment to the life-tenant of a mini
mum amount of income each month and if the amount of income at
any time falls short the trustee is directed to make up the amount
out of corpus. The court in this relation remarks as follows:
“The only contingency upon the happening of which the trustee
would be justified in paying over to the life-tenant any portion
of the corpus would be as provided in the will; yet, if the argu
ment on behalf of the life-tenant is to be given effect, the trustee
would be required to withdraw from the corpus of the estate the
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uninvested portion thereof, represented in the amount of dis
count retained in making purchases of bonds at less than par,
and pay the same over to the life-tenant.” I do not see why
the court refers to the specific provisions mentioned and asso
ciates them with the question of accumulation of discounts. I
do not consider the two matters related.
XII

The court suggests: If it be contended by the life-tenant that
she is not asking the present payment over to her of such dis
count, but only the accumulation for her benefit, the answer is
twofold. First, the right to have the discount accumulated
must rest upon her right to receive the same now or later as in
come, which right does not exist. Second, there is no provision
in the will which would empower the trustee to accumulate any
portion of the trust property in any other form than as part of
the corpus. The declaration of the court “which right does not
exist” is dogmatic and without reason (referring to the claim of
the life-tenant to accumulating discount). The further declara
tion, that there is no provision in the will to accumulate in any
other form than as part of the corpus, is beside the point at issue.
Since accumulations of discount on bonds are herein shown to be
part of the earnings of the investment, why should they not be
paid to the life-tenant as they accrue? That question is answered
above.
XIII
The court offers the following suggestion: It is easy to conceive
of instances during a trust wherein trustees who have justifiably
purchased securities at a discount might later find it advisable to
dispose of such securities at the same price below par at which
they had been purchased. What if in the meantime some court
had directed the (accumulated) discount paid over to the life
tenant? What if the securities become valueless? In such case
would the corpus of the estate be held to suffer not only the loss
incident to the unfortunate investment but also the amount of
the (accumulated) discount which the trustee had in the mean
time been required to pay over to the life-tenant? I would say:
Certainly, so long as the investment is deemed safe—that such
was the fundamental principle and exact basis upon which the
bond was purchased. Trustees do not stop paying over income
278

Accumulation of Discounts
on bonds purchased at par or at a premium, while they are deemed
safe. The same rule ought to apply to bonds purchased at a
discount. If it later develops that an investment in a premium
bond, a discount bond or a par bond has been unfortunate, then
the trustee must stop paying over income thereon. Finally, on
the enforcement of the lien securing any such bond, the proceeds
arising from foreclosure should be applied as directed for proceeds
of foreclosure sales received by trustees. If the proceeds thus
applicable to corpus are greater than the value of the bond as
carried in the accounts of the trustee, there is a profit by appre
ciation; if the proceeds thus applicable to corpus are less, there
is loss by depreciation. Such matters are easily adjusted as they
arise.
Those who without reason wish to controvert the right of the
life-tenant to accumulating discount, suggest the question: What
if a discount bond should default before maturity and be fore
closed?" And if in the meantime the discount be written up as pro
posed, will not the loss to corpus be greater than if the carrying
value of the bond in the accounts of the trustee had been un
changed from the original amount paid? Naturally, if the in
vestment of corpus in a particular bond is greater, any loss sub
sequently sustained will be greater. As income is credited with
the accumulating discount, the investment of corpus in the bond
increases in like amount. That is as it should be and as was con
templated under the fundamental principles controlling purchases
of discount bonds. It is not an accident—it is the writing into the
accounts of the trustee of the fact, considered on the basis of pur
chase, that the discount is less than it was originally and thus the
bond is worth more. From interest period to interest period it
will continue to be less until the bond matures, when the principal
of the bond as a legal obligation will call for payment of par and
will stand in the accounts of the trustee at par. So long as there
is no default in a bond, whether purchased at par or at a premium
or at a discount, the trustee should pay the exact earnings thereon
to the life-tenant. If default occurs in a premium bond, the loss
to corpus may be more than if default occurs in a discount bond,
as a premium bond stands in the accounts of the trustee at an
amount greater than a discount bond. Since we know from ex
perience that discount bonds are no more liable to default than
premium bonds, equally well secured, there is no more reason not
to pay out the exact earnings of a discount bond than the exact
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earnings of a premium bond. The real question is: What are
the actual earnings of the respective bonds? When ascertained,
the duty of the trustee to pay the actual earnings to the life-tenant
should be as positive in the case of a discount bond as in the case
of a premium bond. In the purchase of a premium bond the
amount of the premium over par is all paid out at the time of
purchase; in the purchase of a discount bond the amount of dis
count is spread evenly over the period of time the bond has to run.
Trustees should be required to meet their responsibility in both
cases and use no more hesitancy in the one than in the other.

XIV
The court offers the following suggestions: In the performance
of their duties to invest, preserve and increase the corpus of trusts,
trustees are empowered to purchase and sell securities and re
invest, depending on the state of a variable bond and money
market and upon variations in the value of securities caused
thereby. This being so, to bind trustees by the obligation to
pay over accumulating discounts for the benefit of life-tenants
would involve the integrity of the corpus of the estate, which it is
their duty at all times to preserve intact. I except to the lan
guage of the court in saying that it is the duty of a trustee to in
crease the corpus of the estate. Trustees are never allowed to
speculate. I do not believe the court meant what it said, in
using the words “increase the corpus”. It is the duty of the
trustee to invest and preserve the estate, and if by reason of or
dinary increase in value of trust assets the amount of the estate is
increased, such increase belongs to capital. Likewise if there be
decrease by reason of ordinary decrease in value of trust assets,
the decrease falls on the capital. Let us not confuse decrease
caused by amortization of premiums on bonds purchased by
trustee at a premium, nor increase caused by accumulation of
discount on bonds purchased by trustee at a discount, as ordinary
increase or decrease of trust property. I have already above
taken issue with that proposition. Accumulations of discounts
do not concern the corpus of a trust.

XV

The court offers the following suggestions: It is the duty of
the courts to establish a rule of action which will tend to relieve
the administration of trusts from confusion and avoid possible
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involvements of the corpus of an estate, as would arise out of the
adoption of the proposition for which the life-tenant contends.
Certainly courts should relieve the administration of trusts from
confusion. Certainly courts and trustees should avoid possible
involvements of the corpus of estates. It is borrowing trouble to
say that such confusion and involvements would arise out of the
adoption of the principle propounded. It is known from personal
experience that there is no confusion; also it is known from per
sonal experience that no involvements arise out of the adoption of
the principle. Accounting officers of banks, trust companies and
financial institutions everywhere, accounting officers of lifeinsurance companies and other corporations everywhere, account
ing officers of investment corporations everywhere, accountants of
large individual investors and investment firms everywhere, in
cluding many in the state of California, are familiar with such
practice and are not confused or involved thereby. No; the court
is evading the issue. Also the court is forgetting that there is a
rule of equity underlying all trusts: Trustees must be impartial
between beneficiaries and must render unto each his due, no more
and no less.
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